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The future of the Japanese-Chinese relationship – Pladoyer for a grand 
political bargain 
 
Reinhard Drifte 
 
Introduction 
 
Since Abe Shinzo followed Koizumi Junichiro as Prime Minister in September 2006, 
one might be forgiven for thinking that Japanese-Chinese relations are on a linear 
direction of improvement. Summit meetings have been resumed and there is a great 
array of bilateral dialogues. President Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan in May 2008, resulted in 
70 specific areas of cooperation being set up, which compares with 33 in 1998 (NIDS 
2009, p.117). In November/December 2007, the first Chinese warship visited Japan, 
reciprocated by the first port call of a Japanese destroyer in China in June 2008. In May 
2008, a Japanese relief team assisted in the rescue operations after the Sichuan 
earthquake, and their widely broadcast silent tribute to the dead deeply moved the 
Chinese people. The rapid amelioration of the bilateral relationship also demonstrated 
that the Chinese government still has a lot of clout in suppressing popular dissent 
against Japan (Shimizu 2008, p.245). On 18 June 2008, Japan and China signed an 
agreement which provides a framework for negotiating the joint exploitation of oil and 
gas in disputed areas of the East China Sea.  
 
 But each of these positive events can be contrasted with other developments and 
events which demonstrate the continuing fragility of the relationship. Summits and 
other official meetings are not enough if fundamental divergences cannot be addressed 
but are only papered over. More than a year later, the June 2008 agreement has still not 
led to the start of negotiations for a treaty which would stipulate the modalities of 
extracting oil and gas in the East China Sea. Even the much-reported poisoned frozen 
dumpling incident, in January 2008, is an indication of how a seemingly mere 
technical/criminal incident is difficult to resolve between the relevant authorities of both 
countries (even at summit meetings which involved the pro-China Prime Minister 
Fukuda!). The incident is still not resolved because the Chinese side is unwilling to 
accept the evidence which strongly indicates that the dumplings were tampered with in 
China and not in Japan. The beginning of naval exchanges has been delayed since 1998 
and is very modest when compared with China’s ongoing naval exchanges with other 
East Asian neighbours, or even African countries. It is ironic that the much-acclaimed 
Japanese relief operation in Sichuan also demonstrated the delicate nature of any 
military contacts between the two countries. The initial Chinese agreement to allow 
relief goods to be carried by the ASDF was suddenly cancelled, to the great 
embarrassment (and at the potential cost of the life and welfare of the surviving 
earthquake victims!) of both sides, while China allowed South Korean and US air force 
flights to Chengdu. 
 
 It is tempting to focus on the positive developments, particularly when 
contrasting them with the tensions and the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China during 
the five years of the Koizumi era, and to conclude that somehow things will always be 
sorted out, since, fundamentally, both sides are in full agreement about the importance 
of a good relationship, for their own national interests. On the Japanese side particularly, 
there is the conviction that China very much needs Japan, be it to protect its foreign 
image as a peacefully developing country, to maintain its export- and FDI-dependent 
economy, to cope with its environmental problems, or to reduce its energy consumption, 
that China will always seek a compromise. My argument in this article is that these 
views are too complacent, and that the patchwork of temporising agreements and 
understandings on critical issues does not only fail to resolve disputes like the 
delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea, but actually 
reduces Japan`s options in the medium and long term, while China`s overall power is 
growing. The issue is not whether Japan and China will find long-term strategic stability 
or not – I am optimistic on this point – but rather, at what costs to Japan’s interests, and 
at what costs for the region`s peace and stability during the short and medium term.  
 
 To develop my argument, I will examine the main disputes between the two 
countries and how they are being addressed; and I will make some suggestions which 
move from the hitherto bureaucratic-incremental approach to a more political approach, 
which may provide Japan with more options, even at the cost of some sacrifices. 
 
The long shadow of the past 
 
How to deal with the legacy of Japan’s aggression towards China before 1945 became 
an even more difficult issue as a result of Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to the 
Yasukuni War Shrine. For most Chinese, and many foreign observers, these visits 
proved once again that Japan had not yet come to terms with this legacy in a way 
perceived as sufficient by China, and also by Korea. Unfortunately, the past is reignited 
not only by government leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, but also by the 
distortions of history found in textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, in the 
display of the museum attached to the Yasukuni Shrine (Yushukan), or by insensitive 
remarks made by leading politicians. History also resurfaces in the context of the 
chemical shells abandoned at the time of Japan’s surrender, by the Imperial Army in 
China, which from time to time cause injuries to unsuspecting Chinese who discover 
them by chance. In a unique cooperation between Chinese and Japanese military 
personnel, these shells are now being collected and disposed of in China, since Japan is 
legally obliged to do this. History is also revived as a result of civil litigation suits in 
Japan, by Chinese victims of Japan’s past aggression who want to receive 
compensation.  
 
 There is the impression in Japan that the Chinese government can simply switch 
on and off the relevance of the history issue, in order to manipulate the temperature of 
the bilateral relationship. After several decades of officially declaring that the Japanese 
people had also been victims of the Japanese militarists, in the middle of the 1990s, the 
Chinese government launched its patriotic campaign to overcome the diminishing 
legitimacy of the communist party. Since the party bases its legitimacy partly on the 
anti-Japanese war, the patriotic campaign quickly assumed an anti-Japanese tone, 
reinforced by the building of many memorials and museums related to this war. This 
further encouraged the latent critical attitude of Japan by most Chinese. While 
sometimes opportunistically used by the government to extract concessions from Japan, 
(e.g. on Official Development Assistance, ODA), the anti-Japan movement increasingly 
gained a momentum on its own, and has now become more difficult to control by the 
government. One can also assume that the anti-Japan attitude has been a useful tool to 
enable former President Jiang Zemin and his followers to continue exerting power after 
the handover to President Hu Jintao/Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. But it would have been 
very difficult for the new Hu leadership to pursue better relations with Japan at a time 
when Prime Minister Koizumi insisted on annually visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. While 
many observers in Japan argue that the Chinese government suddenly decided in 2006 
to improve the bilateral relationship because it was deemed better for the overall 
national interest, it would be more correct to say that the Hu/Wen group was able to 
resume its initially positive attitude towards Japan only because Koizumi was gone, and 
because Prime Minister Abe had conveyed that he would not embarrass the Chinese 
government by continuing to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. 
 Japan`s ambiguity about Taiwan 
 
The most sensitive issue for China is the future of Taiwan which weighs heavily on its 
diplomacy, notably with Japan as both the former colonial power in Taiwan between 
1905 and 1945, and as a military ally of the US, the ultimate guarantor of the status quo 
in the Taiwan Strait. For the Chinese government, the incorporation of Taiwan is a 
symbol of finally concluding the civil war against the Guomindang, which was 
interrupted by US intervention in 1950. As a result of having highlighted this theme for 
a long time, the Chinese government has staked the communist party’s legitimacy on it.  
 
 Against a background of growing anti-Communism in the US, and China’s 
intervention against the UN in the Korean War, Japan was forced by the US to sign a 
peace treaty in 1952 with the Guomindang in Taiwan, and not with the new government 
of Mao Zidong in Beijing. The only concession the then Prime Minister Yoshida was 
able to extract consisted in restricting the effectiveness of the treaty to those areas of 
China actually under the control of the Guomindang at the time of conclusion. When 
President Nixon radically changed America’s China policy in 1972, Japan quickly 
recognised the PRC government, and Taiwan broke off diplomatic relations with Tokyo. 
Since then Japan has maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan.  
 
 The Taiwan dispute today resolves around the following issues: 
 
• Japan still refuses to say clearly that Taiwan is part of the PRC. Instead, the 
government merely stated at the time of normalisation of diplomatic relations 
with Beijing in 1972, that it ‘understands and respects’ China’s position that 
Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Japan maintains that it surrendered Taiwan under 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty terms which, however, did not say anything 
about the new owner, and it can therefore not pronounce on the legal status of 
the island. The 1972 statement was a compromise within the ruling LDP party at 
the time, but has now also become a lever for the government vis-à-vis China. 
The Chinese side is naturally opposed to Japan’s position and is suspicious of 
Japan’s ulterior motives (Drifte 2003, p.22). 
 
• Direct, official, inter-governmental contacts between Tokyo and Taibei became 
impossible after 1972, but, with varying degrees of governmental support, both 
sides devised institutions and means whereby to substitute the pre-1972 official 
channels. Officially, Tokyo pursues only ‘non-governmental regional or 
working exchanges’ which are below the rank of ministers. However, Taiwan 
tries to stretch the degree of unofficial relations as much as possible. Notably the 
visits by former President Li Denghui have become on several occasions the 
lightning rod for the ire of the PRC.  
 
• Japan raises the PRC’s suspicion about pursuing a Two-China policy because it 
has sometimes been less forthcoming than even the US on Taiwan’s drive to 
expand its international space. When President Hu Jintao visited the US in April 
2006, President Bush declared that the US is opposed to any unilateral move to 
change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. When Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
visited Japan in April 2007, he asked his Japanese counterpart to declare in their 
joint statement that Japan opposes Taiwan`s independence. But Prime Minister 
Abe Shinzo merely conceded to having the 1972 statement reiterated (Shimizu 
2008, p.28). The PRC is concerned about any move by any foreign country, 
particularly the US and Japan, which may encourage Taiwanese moves towards 
independence. Within this logic, Beijing has also been concerned about Japan’s 
participation in the US-led navy-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
deployment around Japan, which technically could be expanded to protect 
Taiwan against the many intermediate-range missiles deployed by the PRC.  
 
• The most serious Taiwan-related dispute is about security. In the Sato-Nixon 
Joint Communiqué in 1969, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku went as far as declaring 
that the security of both Taiwan and South Korea was essential to that of Japan, 
and that Japan would ‘fulfil its obligations in regard to “the peace and security 
of the Far East”’,(Rose 1998, p.48). Again the PRC vehemently opposed the 
Communiqué, although it would seem natural that war around Taiwan would 
affect Japan’s security since its sea lanes of communication are passing along 
the island, it has considerable commercial interest in Taiwan, and, as an alliance 
partner, it is under some obligation to support US military counter-measures. 
When Japan and the US issued a statement in February, 2005 (Japan-US 
Security Consultative Committee, the so-called 2+2) saying that both countries 
consider a peaceful resolution of tensions in the Taiwan Strait a ‘common 
strategic objective’, Beijing protested against it as an infringement of Chinese 
sovereignty. Strangely, no one seemed to remember the Sato-Nixon Joint 
Communiqué which was much stronger. As a result of China’s protests, Japan 
and the US did not repeat this reference to the Taiwan Strait in the following 
bi-annual 2+2 communiqué in 2007. It is within the Taiwan context that the 
PRC warns Japan and the US to keep the bilateral security treaty limited to 
Japan’s defence. 
 
East China Sea: From ‘Sea of Confrontation’ to ‘Sea of Peace, Cooperation and 
Friendship’?  
 
The disputes in the East China Sea (ECS) are about the sovereignty of the Senkaku 
Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) and the border of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) between Japan and China. The solution of the latter issue is closely related to the 
sovereignty dispute, as well as to an EEZ agreement between China and Korea, and also 
to one between Japan and Korea, the latter having competing claims to an EEZ in the 
northern part of the ECS. Pressure to reach a conclusion comes not only from China’s 
relentless progress in exploring and exploiting oil and gas resources in the ECS, but also 
from the requirement for states to submit scientific evidence to the UN Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, if a state demands more than 200nm of continental 
shelf, which is the case with China. Other pressures come from the interest of Japan and 
China in the fishing resources of the ECS, and from planned exploitation of sea-bottom 
mineral resources by Japan. However, Japan claims that there is no sovereignty dispute 
over the Senkaku Islands, since it is in the comfortable position of having de facto 
control over them, a claim strongly refuted by China. Both countries also apply different 
principles to determine the EEZ border between them. Japan has opted for the median 
line which would equally divide the ECS, since the width of the ECS makes it 
impossible for either country to have the normal 200nm EEZ; China has based its 
delimitation of the Sea on the extended continental shelf theory, which would bring the 
EEZ border to the Okinawa Trough. Neither country has agreed with the Republic of 
Korea on a bilateral EEZ border in the northern part of the EEZ, where the three 
countries’ claims partly overlap, although in the 1970s, Japan and Korea ratified a 
50-year provisional agreement to explore for oil and gas, an agreement strongly 
opposed by China. 
 
 Finding a solution has not been made easier by Japan sending initially 
ambiguous signals to China about its claims, in order to focus on other bilateral 
problems, including Japan’s historical legacy. When negotiating the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations in 1972, and the Treaty on Peace and Friendship of 1978, the 
Japanese side de facto agreed to shelve the territorial issue around the Senkaku Islands. 
Later, however, the Japanese side hardened its position on the Senkaku Islands by 
blocking several semi-private Japanese and Chinese attempts at joint development of 
hydrocarbon resources in the ECS, as well as official Chinese proposals to that end, and 
by insisting on linking such joint development with the confirmation of its title to the 
Senkaku Islands. To resolve the disputes in its favour, the Japanese government could 
have made better use of its most important leverage in the 1970s and 1980s; that is, its 
access to off-shore exploration, extraction, and transportation technologies. Despite 
China’s relentless pursuit of its energy interests in the ECS since the 1980s, Japan 
showed great restraint, until 2004, in surveying the area even on the eastern side of the 
proposed median line. This restraint was already apparent before the ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1996, which advises 
partners to a maritime border dispute not to do anything which would jeopardise or 
hamper a final agreement. Although the Japanese government did not allow any 
company to explore the disputed area until 2004, neither did it even try to get something 
in return from China for this restraint. The Japanese government seemed to be content, 
as long as the Chinese were implicitly respecting the median line, even though there 
were reports in 1995, and afterwards, that Chinese exploration rigs went beyond it. This 
reinforced the Chinese perception that the Japanese government did not care much 
about China beginning explorations, and was instead implicitly condoning them through 
its public silence and its co-financing of the Chinese Pinghu field development, 60 km 
from the median line by the Asian Development Bank and the ExportImport Bank 
(renamed Japan Bank of International Cooperation, in 1999), between 1997 and 2001. 
On the other hand, the sudden change in Japan’s official approach to the disputes from 
2004 gave rise to Chinese suspicions about Japan’s own hunger for energy and its will 
to impede China’s development (Drifte 2008, p.34). 
 
 Despite these open issues, Japan and China concluded several fisheries 
agreements. The last one came into force in February 2000, but sidesteps the disputes 
about the Senkaku Islands and the EEZ delimitation. Exactly one year later, both sides 
put into force a prior notification agreement for research vessels from either side, in 
order to reduce tensions arising from Chinese activities in disputed maritime areas of 
the ECS. Again, however, the agreement does not give the exact locations to which it 
should apply and instead merely refers to ‘areas of interest to Japan’. 
 
 What may have been possible with agreements for fisheries and research vessels 
is not possible, however, with oil and gas extraction, where there are clear locations and 
much higher economic stakes. As tensions escalated around Chinese explorations and 
extractions very close to Japan’s proposed median line, a solution had to be found. On 
18 June 2008, both sides signed the Understanding on Japan-China Joint Development 
in the East China Sea, in order to make the ECS a ‘Sea of Peace, Cooperation and 
Friendship’. The two sides agreed to joint development in an area defined by seven 
measures of longitude and latitude as a first step. The agreement has a map attached 
which shows the area. Both sides declared their willingness to select sites for joint 
development in this area through consultations, and to conclude a bilateral agreement to 
implement joint development. Of particular importance for Japan is that the two sides 
will also consult about other areas outside the above area, for joint development. 
Furthermore, the Chinese side declared its willingness for Japanese legal persons to take 
part in the development of the Chunxiao oil and gas field, in accordance with Chinese 
laws. The Chunxiao field lies just on the Chinese side of the Japan-proposed median 
line, but Japan claims that the hydrocarbon resources straddle both sides of the median 
line, and that Japan should therefore share it. Since this was unacceptable to the Chinese 
side, the above formulation was chosen, but supplementary Chinese statements at the 
time made it clear that Japan had no legal claim to the field (Drifte, 2009).    
  
 The optimists would claim that this understanding proves again (like the earlier 
agreements) that the two sides can resolve disputes (Manicom, 2008). However, a closer 
look at the understanding shows that it is just a temporising device which may offer 
more time to resolve the fundamental issue, but there is no historical inevitability for 
this to happen: 
 
• the understanding says that it is without prejudice to the legal positions of both 
countries concerning the EEZ border delimitation. At the same time, the 
Japanese side can claim that the understanding provides an implicit Chinese 
acknowledgement of the median line because the defined zone for joint 
development roughly straddles this Japanese-proposed line (about 1/7 is on the 
Chinese side). This interpretation is opposed by China. Moreover, the Japanese 
side could not persuade the Chinese side to accept the inclusion of three other oil 
and gas fields (Tianwaitian, Duanqiao, and Longqing), which are also close to 
the median line. The two sides could not even agree on an English text of the 
understanding; 
 • it is merely an agreement on principles, and its implementation demands further 
difficult negotiations and in, Japan`s case, a treaty which will have to be ratified 
by the Diet, potentially exposing the whole venture to the vagaries of party 
politics; 
 
• the understanding has immediately come under strong criticism not only by 
Chinese public opinion, but also by academics who consider it imbalanced and 
unfair, because their government did not manage to include Chinese access 
around the Senkaku Islands, to mirror China’s compromise on the joint 
development area (Drifte 2009). As a result of this criticism, but probably also 
because of the political instability in Japan, there has not yet been a start to 
working-level negotiations for the required treaty. In the meantime, the Japanese 
government made public its concerns about ongoing Chinese activities in the 
area of the gas fields (Japan Times, 29 January 2009;15 July 2009). 
 
Economic competition and political rivalry 
 
These three main issues just discussed, have to be put into the context of the growing 
economic competition and political rivalry of the two countries. The phenomenal 
growth of China’s economy, which also owes a lot to Japan, has led to increased 
competition. While trade between the two countries in the 1980s was dominated by 
China selling natural resources (oil was the major item!) and semi-finished products to 
Japan, trade is increasingly becoming an exchange of processed and manufactured 
goods, at an ever-increasing level of sophistication. Although Japan is still an important 
foreign direct investor in China, since the beginning of the new century, China has 
started, on a very modest scale, to invest in Japan. This is in order to acquire technology, 
brands, market access and marketing skills, and includes the acquisition of distressed 
medium-sized Japanese companies. Already in 2004, the Japanese weekly Ekonomisuto  
published an article with the title ‘Chinese companies are buying Japan!’ (Ekonomisuto, 
14 September 2004). At the end of 2006, more than 320 Chinese enterprises had moved 
into Japan, including major firms like Huawei and Haier, and the amount of Chinese 
investment in Japan stood at $170 million (Xinhua, 6 April 2007).The current economic 
crisis is facilitating these Chinese acquisitions, given the access of Chinese companies 
to considerable foreign currency reserves, Beijing’s support for them and the 
accentuated problems of many Japanese companies. This has naturally given rise to 
Japanese concerns, against the background of many political disputes between the two 
countries. For Japan, it is also psychologically difficult to accept being relegated in its 
economic ranking, but, in view of China’s economic growth, it is only a matter of time 
whether the country will overtake Japan this year or next, as the second-biggest world 
economy in terms of GDP. In February 2006, China overtook Japan as the number one 
in foreign currency reserves, and in November 2008, China overtook Japan as the 
largest holder of US treasury bonds (Financial Times, 5 December 2008). This 
development is naturally linked to the high Yuan exchange rate which is supported by 
the Chinese government. China is a serious competitor for raw materials, food and 
energy. For example, it is now a larger importer of oil than Japan, and overtook Japan in 
2005 as the world`s largest seafood importer. China has a comparative advantage 
because of the size of its consumption, the availability of foreign currency which allows 
it to pay even over the odds, and a foreign aid programme which is not yet bound by the 
rules of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, to which most Western aid 
donors, including Japan, belong.  
 
 The bilateral trade of both countries is now over $200 billion, and ever- 
increasing economic relations, particularly between countries with such different 
political and economic systems, bring with them a rise of economic disputes. China`s 
competitiveness is often seen as unfair because of the state-supported Chinese banking 
system and other particular characteristics of China`s economic system. The biggest 
problems revolve around the unpredictability of the application of laws and regulations 
in such a big country, as well as intellectual property rights. On the latter point, it is an 
irony of history that Japan is now accusing China of doing what European and 
American companies accused Japan of in the 1960s and 1970s. Other tensions are 
created by Japanese concerns about the safety of some Chinese food and cosmetic 
products which receive particularly high media attention in Japan, as was demonstrated 
by the poisoned dumplings case. 
 
 At the same time China is translating its economic might into political, cultural 
and military power. Japan has never been able (or willing) to fully translate its 
economic power into commensurate political, military or cultural power. This is 
because of wisdom (restricting military power, to concentrate on the economy and to 
avoid counterproductive steps by its neighbours!), a lack of consistent leadership and 
vision, an inability to come to terms with its past in a way acceptable to its immediate 
neighbours, poor budget policies, an inward-looking education and cultural system, etc. 
From very early on, however, China has understood how to punch above its weight, 
thanks to an astute manipulation of Japanese (and others’) perceptions of China`s great 
civilisation, the history issue, and its economic potential by using fully the propaganda 
means of an authoritarian government. This enables China even more to translate its 
growing economic might into these other power elements, driven by a desire to rid itself 
of its `100 years of national shame` complex, to achieve welfare for its people (and thus 
to preserve the rule of the Communist Party), and to wrest pre-eminence in Asia from 
the US-led alliance system. 
 
 Japan is confronted with this comprehensive Chinese power in Asia where both 
countries are rivals for leadership and influence, ranging from trying to achieve the 
greatest number of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), to providing the highest share in 
regional financial institutions. China has been faster than Japan in establishing FTAs 
with many Asian (including with ASEAN as a whole), because its FTAs are less 
comprehensive than Japan’s FTAs (or the more comprehensive Economic Partnership 
agreements [EPAs] which the Japanese government prefers to conclude), and have no 
enforcement or dispute mechanism. But China has also been less squeamish than Japan 
about opening its doors to agricultural products and even offered an advanced opening 
to such products (‘Early Harvest’). 
 
 There is also rivalry in many areas at a global level. One of the most galling 
issues for Japan is China’s opposition to Japan’s quest for a permanent UN Security 
Council seat. In 2005, there was a strong movement in China, which was supported by 
the Chinese government, to oppose Japan`s quest. In that year, a new effort had been 
undertaken by Japan, together with the other major three candidates (Germany, Brazil 
and India), and at one point, there seemed to be some chance of progress. The negative 
Chinese attitude towards Japan`s quest is nurtured by rivalry and history. As a rising 
power, China is naturally not inclined to provide Japan with the only major power 
privilege it has so far over Japan (excluding nuclear weapons), and which enables it to 
represent Asia. Japan is a member of the G-8, but not of the UN Security Council, the 
other top table of world politics, whereas China has a permanent UN Security Council 
seat as a result of pre-1945 history. Moreover, all five permanent members have a 
structural interest in not having their power diluted, and they can use their veto to 
oppose any reform. China`s official position on the expansion of the Security Council 
so far has been a reflection of its general policy of acting as a speaker for the Third 
World, arguing that the interests of these countries should be given priority and that 
economic power should not be the decisive criterion (Drifte 2000, p.150-1). The other 
major reason offered is that Japan does not deserve such a status, since it has not yet 
sufficiently come to terms with its past aggression in Asia. Prime Minister Koizumi`s 
annual visits to the Yasukuni War Shrine played fully to the rise of nationalism in China 
in one of his major foreign policy inconsistencies, since at the same time, it was he who 
had re-launched Japan`s efforts to join the Security Council. Another inconsistency on 
this issue was to devalue Japan`s most tangible contribution and most prominent 
argument for a permanent UNSC seat to the UN, i.e. the share of its assessed 
contribution to the UN system, by decreasing it from 19.5 % (2004-06) to 16.6% 
(2007-2009). In view of Koizumi`s Yasukuni Shrine visits, it would have been too 
damaging for the Chinese government to remain silent, although in operational terms, it 
could have left torpedoing Japan`s quest to Tokyo`s closest ally, the US, which was also 
actively opposing an expansion of the Security Council. With the improvement of the 
bilateral relations since 2006, China`s official stance has somewhat changed. Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao mentioned in April 2007, in his speech to the Japanese Diet, that 
China understands Japan's wish to play a larger role in the international community and 
is ready to increase dialogue about United Nations Security Council reforms (Japan 
Times, 13 April 2007). On the occasion of President Hu Jintao`s visit to Japan in May 
2008, the Joint Declaration merely stated that `the Chinese side attaches importance to 
Japan's position and role in the United Nations and desires Japan to play an even greater 
constructive role in the international community`. However, one can assume that Tokyo 
would have to offer much more before any Chinese leader would go any further and 
explicitly mention support for Japan`s Security Council ambitions. China could easily 
do so without `risking` Japan joining the Security Council, since there is sufficient 
opposition and disarray among the UN member states generally on the issue of Security 
Council expansion.  
 
The complexities of engaging China 
 
As we have seen above, none of the three major problems bedevilling the bilateral 
relationship has been resolved, and economic and political rivalry does not create a 
helpful atmosphere.  
 
 Japan’s general approach in dealing with China has been to engage the country 
in as many policy fields as possible. This engagement policy basically consists of 
offering China political and economic incentives to become a responsible shareholder, 
which pursues political and economic policies beneficial to the liberal economic system, 
hedged by political and military measures to prevent China from becoming a military 
threat. The challenge is to get the balance of this complex policy right between its soft 
and hard elements. Japan may proclaim its emphasis on trade, dialogue and a minimal 
defence effort, but, from a Chinese perspective, Japan also provides military bases to the 
US, relies on a much more sophisticated nuclear weapon system than China has and 
deploys a BMD system which may deny the Chinese missile system its deterrence value. 
The ambiguity of engagement policy may therefore reinforce the Realist tendencies of 
China’s military strategists. But even the soft elements of engagement policy may 
produce undesirable outcomes depending on one’s perspective. The Chinese leadership 
knows quite well of the Western hope that the soft elements will lead to a change of the 
political system in China. This cannot be in the interests of the Chinese communist 
party, which instead hopes to select certain elements of capitalism to maintain its power 
monopoly. Even the very success of engagement policy contributes to environmental 
degradation in China as well as in the Northeast Asian region, and makes China even 
faster, an even more formidable competitor of Japan. The danger of reinforcing a 
foreign trade- and FDI-dependent policy has become more than apparent with the 
current world economic crisis. 
 
 The outcome of engagement policy is still to be seen, because China has become 
neither an aggressive expansionist power nor a capitalist liberal democracy which has 
renounced the use of force; for example, for solving the Taiwan issue. What is clear is 
not only that China’s economy is enmeshed to such a high degree in the world economy 
that it could not extract itself without suffering severe domestic problems, but also that 
in the process, its power has increased enormously. Therefore, the West’s professed 
goal of creating greater interdependence, with the implicit assumption of the West 
having more leverage, is no longer that clear-cut.  
 
 The pursuit of this policy has been economically very beneficial for Japan as 
well as for China. It has helped Japan to become the world’s second biggest economic 
power, and to cope with its economic decline after the burst of its economic bubble at 
the beginning of the 1990s. China’s success of stimulating its domestic economy will 
now partly depend upon Japan’s ability to salvage its external trade-focused economy 
from the ravages of the current world economic crisis. China was greatly helped in 
achieving its economic growth by Japanese exports of goods, capital, technology and 
ODA. The continued availability of Japanese environmental and energy-saving 
technology will determine to what extent China can maintain its economic growth, 
while protecting its citizens from environmental damage.  
 
Negotiating strategies and some of their pitfalls 
 
Dialogues are part of the political incentives of engagement policy. In the last few years, 
a long and very diverse list of bilateral official fora has been created which shows the 
scope and depth of the Japan-China relationship. These include the ministerial 
High-Level Economic Meeting (start in November, 2007), the dialogue on UN and UN 
Security Council reform (start in March, 2007), the Mekong region dialogue (start 
2008), the Vice-ministerial Comprehensive Policy Dialogue since 2005 (referred to by 
China as `strategic dialogue`), and many other political and economic dialogues, at 
different levels and on many subjects. These dialogues are part of what, since 2006, 
both countries call ‘mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests’. 
The lexical awkwardness of this phrase, and the exaggeration of what is plain common 
sense for any bilateral relationship, say a lot about how difficult the goal of mutually 
beneficial relations is to achieve.  
 
 The problem with the emphasis on dialogue is not only the underlying ambiguity 
about the ultimate outcome of engagement policy, but also that dialogues can be 
conducted for their own sake, to win time and to bridge the gap between periods of 
rudderless political leadership. This has been quite clear in the case of the ECS where 
dialogue has led only to temporising agreements, which have allowed China to move 
from exploration to exploitation of the Sea’s hydrocarbon resources, to promote its legal 
position, and to translate its growing economic strength into political and military power. 
It is important for Japan to make its position very clear to China as many suggest (IIPS, 
2008; Bush, 2009), since China does the same and Japan’s past procrastinations and 
conflict-avoidance tactics have not worked. However, dialogue must have substance and 
be aimed at outcomes which can be presented as win-win situations for both sides.  
 
 The intention of winning time through dialogue or even through its refusal can 
prove counterproductive. Depending on the issue, the question has to be asked whether 
keeping a thorn in the side of the bilateral relationship is really gaining Japan any 
favours in the medium and long term, or whether this is, like keeping its ambiguity over 
the status of Taiwan, a cheap lever for short-term gain, but with long-term costs. As 
shown above, Japan has blocked any discussion about the Senkaku Islands and thus 
made any delimitation of the EEZ at most only partially feasible. In the case of the ECS, 
the government has not used any gain of time to put into operation its now past- 
technological leverage to extract concessions from China, and even sent misleading 
signals to China about its commitment to its legal position. China has now surveyed 
most of the ECS and started exploitation of its hydrocarbon resources, thus creating a 
skewed negotiation basis for Japan, which did only a partial survey as late as 2004. The 
understanding of 18 June 2008 seems to have been a pyrrhic victory (i.e. China’s 
implicit recognition of the median line and the exclusion of the southern part of the 
ECS) for Japan because it created a foundation on which the Chinese government seems 
to be unable to proceed with treaty negotiations. China’s negotiating diplomacy can be 
blamed, but the point is that time is not working on Japan’s behalf. China is increasing 
its maritime military force and is no longer hesitant in demonstrating it. When the 
Japanese government allowed a private company in 2004 to conduct a geological survey 
on the Japanese side of the median line, a Chinese surveillance vessel, and later two 
warships, tried to chase away the survey ship (Asahi Shimbun, 13 October 2004; 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 April 2005). The possibility of military clashes and a naval arms 
race can no longer be excluded. When it became known in July 2009 that the Defense 
Ministry is considering deploying some Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) units on 
Japan’s most southern (undisputed) island of Yonaguni, to better protect its islands 
(including the Senkaku Islands), the Chinese government expressed its ‘hope’ that this 
would contribute to regional peace and stability (Tokyo Shimbun, 2 July 2009). Any 
further loss of time, therefore, can not work in favour of strengthening Japan’s 
negotiating position, but rather decreases it and puts more pressure on achieving a result, 
in order to avoid more military tensions and to protect other areas of the bilateral 
relationship from souring.  
 
 Japan’s negotiating position is, of course, impeded by domestic instability and 
weak political leadership. In addition, public opinion has hardened against China, 
particularly as a result of China’s actions in the ECS. Also, the Foreign Ministry’s 
China School has been weakened by accusations of having been too accommodating 
towards China in the past. This does not give much room for imaginative policies and 
difficult compromises, but rather encourages a bureaucratic approach against the 
background of heightened nationalism. As a result, the bureaucracy is inclined to stick 
to rigid positions and temporising tactics which have only the merit of taking the heat 
out of acute problems.  
 
 Recently the Japanese government has tried to increase its leverage in China by 
promoting the transfer of environmental and energy-saving technologies through ODA 
programmes and the private sector. In 2006, Tokyo hosted a Japan-China forum for 
technical experts on energy-saving technologies; and, on the occasion of Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao`s visit to Japan in April 2007, an energy dialogue was organised at short 
notice which was attended by about 650 Japanese and Chinese business executives from 
oil, gas, electricity and other energy-related companies. This dialogue is to be held 
annually (Japan Times, 13 April 2007). Other fora have followed to project Japan as an 
indispensable partner for China. This seems to be an appropriate strategy if one simply 
follows economic logic, i.e. the economic interdependence of both countries and the 
huge problems which China faces. But one has also to take into account that China’s is 
an authoritarian political system which can, to an extent unimaginable in a functioning 
democracy (although increasingly less so), sacrifice the living conditions and health of 
its people, and refuse foreign aid. Japan’s ODA is still very important to China, even 
after the ending of its loan programme in 2008, which occupied the largest part of 
Japan`s ODA. But Japan`s ODA has considerably lost political fungibility and there are 
many other Western countries which are keen to provide China with ODA, as a means 
of getting a better foothold in the Chinese market. This allows the Chinese government 
to be selective, or even to play one donor country against another, particularly in view 
of the poor communication among donors.  
 
Preconditions for a new China policy 
 
A more promising Japanese-China policy has to be conceived by better taking the 
global, regional and bilateral frameworks of Japan into account. The global/regional 
context is, above all, framed by Japan’s comprehensive alliance with the US, and the 
growing US rivalry with China. Nowhere is Japan’s entrapment-abandonment dilemma 
towards the US more evident than in the triangular Japan-US-China context! How does 
Japan see its role in Washington`s China policy, which is still aimed at maintaining its 
preponderance in Asia? If it concedes from the beginning that China will become a 
threat if the US preponderance is not maintained, then its margin for a different China 
policy will remain limited. In such a case, it will have to support the current US 
approach to Taiwan, for example, which includes the danger of having to allow the 
deployment of Japan-based military assets for any US military action, in the case of a 
confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, so exposing itself to a pre-emptive Chinese military 
operation. Supporting US preponderance may also (among other reasons) lead to a 
naval arms race and accentuate Japan’s (and China’s) security dilemma. Japan will also 
reduce its ability to promote, let alone assume a leadership function in, the 
establishment of an Asian security system inclusive of China, which has to be the 
ultimate goal. But how long will the US be able to maintain its current preponderance, 
which is daily becoming more costly? Japan runs the risk of being marginalised if the 
US suddenly determines to accommodate China on the Taiwan issue, or on any other 
East Asian issue dear to Japan, because its balance of interests has changed, as in 1972; 
and if Japan is considered to be of lesser importance, or even as an obstacle, as, for 
example, in the case of Japan insisting on solving the abductee problem, rather than 
giving priority to the denuclearisation of North Korea. Even on the history issue, Japan 
exposed itself to criticism from the Bush Administration because Koizumi’s Yasukuni 
Shrine visits reduced Japan’s value as an American partner in Asia. An American 
backlash may also occur if Japan disappoints the US, for example, by suddenly 
wavering on allowing the US, in an emergency, to use its military assets on Japanese 
territory. Japan was very reluctant in 1996 when the US reacted to Chinese missile tests 
in the Taiwan Strait, although in the end this spurred both sides to develop new Joint 
Guidelines (Drifte 2003, p.65-6). The US support of Japan in the ECS is ambivalent. 
Washington does not take any position on the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, but 
declares that the islands fall within the scope of the bilateral security treaty. The US is, 
above all, interested in maintaining the freedom of sea lanes and is already now 
confronting China on this principle, as was demonstrated in several US-China incidents 
off Hainan Island. This can push the US to drawing Japan into a wider confrontation 
with China without Japan really getting any help on the Senkaku Islands, let alone US 
support for the delimitation in the ECS, on the basis of the UNCLOS, which the US still 
refuses to ratify. 
 
 The growing economic competition (but, in the end, also political rivalry) with 
China can be met only by Japan reforming its economy, and responding imaginatively 
to the challenges arising from China’s economic rise, and from the current world 
economic crisis. If Japan is not willing or able to do so, it will have to concede sooner 
or later China’s preponderance, and will also lose an important element constituting US 
interest in Japan as a comprehensive partner, resulting in what is called ‘Japan passing’. 
In the economic field, Japan is already sometimes in rivalry with China for the attention 
of the US. Military prowess and a policy of containment would not help Japan in such a 
case, but only hasten its decline. Economic strength is only part of Japan’s ability to 
secure its interest in the regional rivalry with China. Other elements are a more 
aggressive policy on FTAs in Asia, and a more creative role in many other Asian moves 
towards regional cooperation and integration. Successfully meeting economic 
competition does not mean always being ahead of China (which is simply no longer 
possible in many cases), but rather exploiting its comparative advantages. Managing 
regional rivalry also does not require Japan to be the leader in all areas, but to be 
communicative, responsive and imaginative; in short, to learn how to punch at least 
according to its weight. However, ‘value diplomacy’ or the creation by Japan of an ‘Arc 
of Freedom and Prosperity’, directed at countries like Australia, New Zealand or India, 
will not only antagonize China because of its implicit ‘soft containment’, but will also 
be ineffective with many of the target countries: For example, India certainly has 
considerable differences with China, but is fundamentally opposed to being the card of 
any other country and of being part of an anti-China group. Australia has very strong 
economic interests in China as a major customer for its natural resources.   
 
 Instead Japan should further promote and actively participate in the various 
Asian regional fora. As a result of their political and economic vulnerabilities, the 
ASEAN countries welcome a strong and imaginative Japanese, as well as US and 
European, contribution to regional cooperation and integration, rather than having to 
submit to China. For this, Japan will have to change its agricultural policy (the main 
obstacle for Japan’s EPA policy), and to find an answer to the question about the future 
of US predominance in Asia. Japan will have to become a critical supporter of a 
credible and multilaterally fully-engaged US in the region, and maintain its political, as 
well as economic, high value for its regional partners. Particularly worthwhile are the 
summit meetings between Japan, China and Korea which started in 1999, on the 
occasion of ASEAN summits with dialogue partners, but which, since December 2008, 
have begun to be held separately from the ASEAN summits. The involvement of the 
Republic of Korea is important because of the many political and economic affinities 
between Japan and Korea. A positive Japan-Korea relationship helps Japan with 
regional rivalry, and protects Korea from being too susceptible to Chinese pressure 
(economic competition, relations with North Korea, etc). Transforming the Six Party 
Talks into a framework for security cooperation in Northeast Asia is, however, less 
promising because it would make regional security cooperation a hostage to North 
Korea`s erratic behaviour, or make it downright impossible if we consider North 
Korea`s declaration in 2009, to never return to these Talks. 
 
Policy suggestions 
 After clarifying its position and policies on the regional/global as well as economic 
frameworks, the following policies towards the three main disputes with China would 
be possible for Japan if China plays its part as well: 
 
• Finding closure to the history issue is a distant goal. Trying to alleviate the 
various legacies arising from Japan’s past, for example, by removing the 
abandoned chemical shells, showing a less legalistic approach to civil 
compensation demands, promoting youth exchanges, etc., can improve the 
situation in the medium term. Coming to terms with the past is more than simply 
issuing some apologies or having proved its peaceful development since 1945, 
but is an ongoing process of truth seeking and contrition which elevates Japan’s 
moral standing, and should make the younger generation proud of its country. 
The Hu Jintao leadership has now publicly acknowledged that Japan has 
delivered several apologies and pursued peaceful development, but there is no 
room for Japanese complacency as the list of history-related issues shows. A 
sincere Japanese attitude may even become a model for China to come to terms 
with the dark sides of its own recent history.   
 
• On its part, the Chinese government has to continue to recognise Japan’s 
apologies (even if they have sometimes been less than convincing), and Japan’s 
pursuit of a peaceful diplomacy since 1945. Moreover Beijing has to undo the 
consequences of having in the past encouraged, or at least tolerated, an 
anti-Japan mood, to show positive leadership in directing public opinion towards 
today’s Japan and not the Japan of pre-1945, and to resist any temptation in 
invoking an anti-Japan mood to achieve its foreign and security policy. The 
different social and political systems of both countries make reconciliation 
difficult, particularly against the background of competition and rivalry. 
Agreeing on a joint historical text book will be very problematic for a long time 
to come, but at least juxtaposing the perspectives of both sides in a single book 
would be an achievement. Both governments still have too much influence over 
textbooks (the Chinese government even more than the Japanese); and regarding 
bilateral history commission, Chinese historians still consider themselves too 
much as official representatives, rather than representative, of their discipline.  
 
• Whereas the history issue can poison the bilateral atmosphere, damage Japan’s 
legitimacy and moral position bilaterally and internationally, and thus make 
addressing the other major problems even more difficult to resolve, the Taiwan 
problem and the ECS disputes are more acute and severe. On Taiwan the 
Japanese decision-makers have to consider whether antagonising China with 
their ambiguity over Taiwan’s status, independence efforts and security, 
achieves really worthwhile leverage. The current Guomindang-headed Taiwan 
government is making surprising approaches to Beijing and the island’s 
economic dependence (particularly in overcoming the deep recession caused by 
the economic crisis) is increasingly limiting the future options of Taiwan. The 
red line for Japan should be the use of force to change the status quo and the 
freedom of sea lanes. Petty leverage can only divert China`s attention from this 
fundamental Japanese interests, and delegitimise, in China`s eyes, Japan`s 
national and alliance counter measures. These interests are, ultimately, also the 
red lines for the US, for whom the PRC is politically and economically 
becoming increasingly important, despite its attachment to maintaining its 
predominance in Asia. Such legitimate interests can also be explained to China 
bilaterally. 
 
• The most difficult issue is turning the ECS into a Sea of Peace and Cooperation. 
Japan has to envisage a move away from bureaucratic and legal tactics to a 
grand political package deal which includes Japanese compromises on the 
Senkaku Islands and on the median line, in order to pull a dangerous thorn out of 
the side of the relationship, and to pursue the risk-free exploitation of the many 
natural resources of the ECS. Access to a secure EEZ with maximum size 
should be considered the most important goal. The Japanese government could 
put a clarified position on Taiwan into a grand political package deal. Japan’s 
position would be strengthened by integrating Korea into the delimitation of the 
EEZ. 
 
These are politically very difficult compromises for Japan and they will make sense 
only if the other framework issues are adequately addressed. But the alternative may be 
for Japan to be forced to make the same compromises later, but without receiving much 
in return from China. Japan has to free itself from ballast in order to pursue, with greater 
clarity and legitimacy, its interests in a world which is changing fast and dramatically as 
a result of China’s growing comprehensive power. It has to be able (economically, 
politically and militarily) to credibly defend these interests as its own, while trying to 
make them overlap with those of as many other countries as possible. China, on the 
other hand, should also show willingness to compromise. It cannot be in China`s 
interests to heighten tensions in Asia (North Korea is already doing enough damage to 
China’s security interests in Northeast Asia!), to create a regional arms race and to 
provide fodder for the perception of the ‘China threat’. Japan is an extremely useful 
partner in helping China to cope with the many problems which will increasingly 
challenge the leadership. Too many Chinese are underestimating the goodwill which 
many Japanese still have towards China, but this goodwill is perishable and the young 
Japanese need to have a chance of inheriting it from their elders! A new government 
which is not dominated by the LDP might provide both sides with another chance. 
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